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DEMAND-INDEPENDENT OPTIMAL TOLLS
RICCARDO COLINI-BALDESCHI, MAX KLIMM, AND MARCO SCARSINI
Abstract. Wardrop equilibria in nonatomic congestion games are in general
inefficient as they do not induce an optimal flow that minimizes the total travel
time. Network tolls are a prominent and popular way to induce an optimum
flow in equilibrium. The classical approach to find such tolls is marginal cost
pricing which requires the exact knowledge of the demand on the network. In
this paper, we investigate under which conditions demand-independent opti-
mum tolls exist that induce the system optimum flow for any travel demand in
the network. We give several characterizations for the existence of such tolls
both in terms of the cost structure and the network structure of the game.
Specifically we show that demand-independent optimum tolls exist if and only
if the edge cost functions are shifted monomials as used by the Bureau of Pub-
lic Roads. Moreover, non-negative demand-independent optimum tolls exist
when the network is a directed acyclic multi-graph. Finally, we show that
any network with a single origin-destination pair admits demand-independent
optimum tolls that, although not necessarily non-negative, satisfy a budget
constraint.
1. Introduction
The impact of selfish behavior on the efficiency of traffic networks is a long-
standing topic in the algorithmic game theory and operations research literature.
Already more than half a century ago, Wardrop (1952) stipulated a main principle
of a traffic equilibrium that—in light of the omnipresence of modern route guid-
ance systems—is as relevant as ever: “The journey times on all the routes actually
used are equal, and less than those which would be experienced by a single vehicle
on any unused route.” This principle can be formalized by modeling traffic as a
flow in a directed network where edges correspond to road segments and vertices
correspond to crossings. Each edge is endowed with a cost function that maps the
total amount of traffic on it to a congestion cost that each flow particle traversing
the edge has to pay. Further, we are given a set of commodities, each specified by
an origin, a destination, and a flow demand. In this setting, a Wardrop equilibrium
is a multi-commodity flow such that for each commodity the total cost of any used
path is not larger than the total cost of any other path linking the commodity’s
origin and destination. Popular cost functions, put forward for the use in traffic
models by the U.S. Bureau of Public Roads (1964) are of the form
ce(xe) = te
(
1 + α
(xe
ke
)β)
, (1.1)
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Figure 1. Dependence of the marginal cost tolls for the Pigou network.
where xe is the traffic flow along edge e, te ≥ 0 is the free-flow travel time, ke is
the capacity of edge e and α and β are parameters fitted to the model.
While Wardrop equilibria are guaranteed to exist under mild assumptions on the
cost functions (Beckmann et al., 1956), it is well known that they are inefficient
in the sense that they do not minimize the overall travel time of all commodities
(Pigou, 1920). A popular mechanism to decrease the inefficiency of selfish routing
are congestion tolls. A toll is a payment that the system designer defines for each
edge of the graph and that has to be paid by each flow particle traversing the edge.
By carefully choosing the edges’ tolls, the system designer can steer the Wardrop
equilibrium in a favorable direction. A classic approach first due to Pigou (1920)
is marginal cost pricing where the toll of each edge is equal to difference between
the marginal social cost and the marginal private cost of the system optimum
flow on that edge. Marginal cost pricing induces the system optimal flow—the
one that minimizes the overall travel time—as a Wardrop equilibrium (Beckmann
et al., 1956). Congestion pricing is not only an interesting theoretical issue that
links system optimal flows and traffic equilibria, but also a highly relevant tool
in practice, as various cities of the world, including Stockholm, Singapore, Bergen,
and London, implement congestion pricing schemes to mitigate congestion (Gomez-
Ibanez and Small, 1994; Small and Gómez-Ibáñez, 1997).
The problem. Marginal cost pricing is an elegant way to induce the system opti-
mum flow as a Wardrop equilibrium, but the concept crucially relies on the exact
knowledge of the travel demand. As an example consider the Pigou network in
Fig. 4a for an arbitrary flow demand of µ > 0 going from o to d. The optimal
flow only uses the lower edge with cost function c(x) = x as long as µ ≤ 1/2. For
demands µ > 1/2, a flow of 1/2 is sent along the lower edge and the remaining flow
of µ− 1/2 is sent along the upper edge. Using marginal cost pricing the toll of the
lower edge is min{µ, 1/2} and no toll is to be payed for the upper edge, see Fig. 1b.
This toll scheme is problematic as it depends on the flow demand µ in the
network. In particular, when the demand is estimated incorrectly, the resulting
tolls will be sub-optimal. Assume the network designer expects a flow of µ = 1/4
and, thus, sets a (marginal cost) toll of τ2 = 1/4 on the lower link. When the actual
total flow demand is higher than expected and equal to µ = 1, a fraction 1/4 of
the flow uses the upper edge and 3/4 of the flow uses the lower edge resulting in
a cost of 1/4 + 9/16. However, it is optimal to induce an equal split between the
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Figure 2. Braess network.
edge which can be achieved by a toll of 1/2 on the lower edge. Quite strikingly, the
toll of τ2 = 1/2 is optimal for all possible demand values as it always induces the
optimal flow: For demands less than 1/2, a toll of 1/2 on the lower edge does not
hinder any flow particle from using the lower edge, which is optimal. On the other
hand, for any demand larger 1/2, the toll of 1/2 on the lower edge forces the flow
on this edge to not exceed 1/2, which is optimal as well.
The situation is even more severe for the Braess network in Fig. 2. When the
system designer expects a traffic demand of 1 going from o to d, marginal cost
pricing fixes a toll of 1 on both the upper left and the lower right edge (both with
cost function c(x) = x). When the demand is lower than expected, say, µ = 1/2,
under marginal cost pricing, the flow is split equally between the lower and the
upper path leading to a total cost of 5/4. The optimal flow with flow value 1/2,
however, only uses the zig-zag-path o→ u→ v → d with cost 1. It is interesting to
note that this flow is actually equal to the Wardrop equilibrium without any tolls.
To conclude this example, marginal cost pricing may actually increase the total
cost of the Wardrop equilibrium when the travel demand is estimated incorrectly.
We note that also in the Braess graph, there is a distinct toll vector that enforces
the optimum flow as a Wardop equilibrium for any demand. We will see that by
setting a toll of 1 on the central edge from u to v, the Wardrop equilibrium for any
flow demand is equal to the respective optimum flow.
We conclude that for both the Pigou network and the Braess network, marginal
cost pricing is not robust with respect to changes in the demand since wrong es-
timates of the travel demand lead to sub-optimal tolls. Since such changes may
occur frequently in road networks (e.g., due to sudden weather changes, accidents,
or other unforeseen events), marginal cost pricing does not use the full potential of
congestion pricing and may even be harmful for the traffic. On the other hand, for
both networks, there exist tolls that enforce the optimum flow as an equilibrium
for any flow demand. In this paper, we systematically study conditions for such
demand-independent optimal tolls to exist.
Our results. In this paper we study the existence of demand-independent optimum
tolls (DIOTs) that induce the optimum flow as an equilibrium for any flow demand.
We give a precise characterization in terms of the cost structure on the edges for
DIOTs to exists. Specifically, we show that DIOTs exist for any network where the
cost of each edge is a BPR-type function, i.e.,
ce(x) = te + aex
β
e for all e ∈ E , (1.2)
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where te, ae ∈ R+ are arbitrary while β ∈ R+ is a common constant for all edges
e ∈ E . This existence result holds regardless of the topology of the network and
on the number of origin-destination (O/D) pairs. On the other hand, for any cost
function that is not of the form as in (1.2), there is a simple network consisting of
two parallel edges with cost function c and cost function c+ b for some b > 0 that
does not admit a DIOT. Our existence result for networks with BPR-type cost
functions is proven in terms of a characterization that uniquely determines the sum
of the tolls along each path that is used by the optimum flow for some demand.
In general the DIOTs used in the characterization may use negative tolls as well.
We provide an example of a network with BPR-type cost functions where a non-
negative DIOT does not exist. Besides conditions on the costs, conditions on the
network are needed to guarantee the existence of non-negative DIOTs. We show
that non-negative DIOTs exist for directed acyclic multi-graphs (DAMGs) with
BPR-type cost functions, like the Pigou network and the Braess network discussed
in § 1. This condition on the network is sufficient, but not necessary for the existence
of non-negative DIOTs.
Under a weaker condition than DAMG, we prove the existence of DIOTs that
follow a budget constraint of non-negativity of the total amount of tolls. This
condition is satisfied by networks with a single O/D pair.
Due to space constraint, some of the proofs are deferred to the appendix.
Related work. Marginal cost pricing as a means to reduce the inefficiency of selfish
resource allocation was first proposed by Pigou (1920) and subsequently discussed
by Knight (1924). Wardrop (1952) introduced the notion of a traffic equilibrium
where each flow particle only uses shortest paths. Beckmann et al. (1956) showed
that marginal cost pricing always induces the system optimal flow as a Wardrop
equilibrium. The set of feasible tolls that induce optimal flows was explored by
Bergendorff et al. (1997); Hearn and Ramana (1998); Larsson and Patriksson (1999).
They showed that the set of optimal tolls can be described by a set of linear equa-
tions and inequalities.
This characterization led to various developments regarding the optimization
of secondary objectives of the edge tolls, such as the minimization of the tolls
collected from the users (Bai et al., 2004; Dial, 1999, 2000), or the minimzation of
the number of edges that have positive tolls (Bai and Rubin, 2009; Bai et al., 2010).
A problem closely related to the latter is to compute tolls for a given subset of edges
with the objective to minimize the total travel time of the resulting equilibrium.
Hoefer et al. (2008) showed that this problem is NP-hard for general networks,
and gave an efficient algorithm for parallel edges graphs with affine cost functions.
Harks et al. (2015) generalized their result to arbitrary cost functions satisfying a
technical condition. Bonifaci et al. (2011) studied generalizations of this problem
with further restrictions on the set of feasible edge tolls.
For heterogenous flow particles that trade off money and time differently, mar-
ginal cost pricing cannot be applied to find tolls that induce the system optimum
flow. In this setting, Cole et al. (2003) showed the existence of a set of tolls en-
forcing the system optimal flow, when there is a single commodity in the network.
Similarly, Yang and Huang (2004) studied how it is possible to design toll structure
when there are users with different toll sensitivity. Fleischer (2005) showed that
in single source series-parallel networks the tolls have to be linear in the latency
of the maximum latency path. Karakostas and Kolliopoulos (2006) and Fleischer
4
et al. (2004) independently generalized this result to arbitrary networks. Han et al.
(2008) extended the previous results to different classes of cost functions.
Most of the literature assumes that the charged tolls cause no disutilty to the
network users. For the case where tolls contribute to the cost, Cole et al. (2006)
showed that marginal cost tolls do not improve the equilibrium flow for a large class
of instances, including all instances with affine costs. They further showed that for
these networks it is NP-hard to approximate the minimal total cost that can be
achieved as a Wardrop equilibrium with tolls. Karakostas and Kolliopoulos (2005)
proved that the total disutility due to taxation is bounded with respect to the social
optimum for large classes of latency functions. Moreover, they showed that, if both
the tolls and the latency are part of the social cost, then for some latency functions
the coordination ratio improves when taxation is used. For networks of parallel
edges, Christodoulou et al. (2014) studied a generalization of edge tolls where cost
functions are allowed to increase in an arbitrary way. They showed that for affine
cost functions, the price of anarchy is strictly better than in the original network,
even when the demand is not known.
Brown and Marden (2016, 2017) studied how marginal tolls can create perverse
incentives when users have different sensitivity to the tolls and how it possible
to circumvent this problem. Caragiannis et al. (2006) studied the optimal toll
problem for atomic congestion games. They proved that in the atomic case the
optimal system performance cannot be achieved even in very simple networks. On
the positive side they shown that there is a way to assign tolls to edges such that the
induced social cost is within a factor of 2 to the optimal social cost. Singh (2008)
observed that marginal tolls weakly enforce optimal flows. Fotakis and Spirakis
(2008) showed that in series-parallel networks with increasing cost functions the
optimal social cost can be induced with tolls. Meir and Parkes (2016) discussed
how in atomic congestion games with marginal tolls multiple equilibria are near-
optimal when there is a large number of players.
In Sandholm (2002, 2007) the problem is studied from a mechanism design per-
spective where the social planner has no information over the preferences of the
users and has limited ability to observer the users’ behavior.
2. Model and preliminaries
In this section, we present some notation and basic definitions that are used in
the sequel. We start with the underlying network model and will then introduce
equilibria and tolls.
Network model. We consider a finite directed multi-graph G = (V , E) with vertex
set V and edge set E . We call (v → v′) the set of all edges e whose tail is v and
whose head is v′. We assume that there is a finite set of origin-destination (O/D)
pairs i ∈ I, each with an individual traffic demand µi ≥ 0 that has to be routed
from an origin oi ∈ V to a destination di ∈ V via G. Denote the demand vector by
µ = (µi)i∈I . We call P
i the set of (simple) paths joining oi to di, where each path
p ∈ P i is a finite sequence of edges such that the head of each edge meets the tail
of the subsequent edge. For as long as all pairs (oi, di) are different, the sets P i are
disjoint. Call P :=
⋃
i∈I P
i the union of all such paths.
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Each path p is traversed by a flow fp ∈ R+. Call f = (fp)p∈P the vector of flows
in the network. The set of feasible flows for µ is defined as
F(µ) =
{
f ∈ RP+ :
∑
p∈Pi fp = µ
i for all i ∈ I
}
. (2.1)
In turn, a routing flow f ∈ F(µ) induces a load on each edge e ∈ E as
xe =
∑
p∋e
fp. (2.2)
We call x = (xe)e∈E the corresponding load profile on the network. For each
e ∈ E consider a nondecreasing, continuous cost function ce : R+ → R+. Denote
c = (ce)e∈E . If x is the load profile induced by a feasible routing flow f , then
the incurred delay on edge e ∈ E is given by ce(xe); hence, with a slight abuse
of notation, the associated cost of path p ∈ P is given by the expression cp(f ) ≡∑
e∈p ce(xe). We call the tuple Γ = (G, I, c) a (nonatomic) routing game.
Equilibrium Flows and Optimal Flows. A routing flow f∗ is a Wardrop equilibrium
(WE) of Γ if, for all i ∈ I, we have:
cp(f
∗) ≤ cp′(f
∗) for all p, p′ ∈ P i such that f∗p > 0.
This concept was introduced by Wardrop (1952). Beckmann et al. (1956) showed
that Wardrop equilibria are the optimal solutions to the convex optimization prob-
lem
min
∑
e∈E
∫ xe
0
ce(s)ds
s.t.: xe =
∑
p∋e
fp
f ∈ F ,
and, thus, are guaranteed to exist. A social optimum (SO) is a flow that minimizes
the overall travel time, i.e., it solves the following total cost minimization problem:
min L(f) =
∑
p∈P
fpcp(f),
s.t.: f ∈ F .
(2.3)
A shown by Beckmann et al. (1956), all Wardrop equilibria have the social cost.
We write Eq(Γ) = L(f∗) and Opt(Γ) = minf∈F L(f), where f
∗ is a Wardrop
equilibrium of Γ. The game’s price of anarchy (PoA) is then defined as PoA(Γ) =
Eq(Γ)/Opt(Γ). It is known that Wardrop equilibria need not minimze the social
cost, in that case PoA(Γ) > 1. For a pair i ∈ I, we denote the set of paths that are
eventually used in a optimum flow for some demand vector µ by
P˜ i = {p ∈ P i : f˜p(µ) > 0 for some demand µ and corresponding social optimum f˜(µ)}.
Here and in the following we write f (µ) instead of f when we want to indicate the
corresponding demand vector µ.
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Tolls. We want to explore the possibility of imposing tolls on the edges of the
network in such a way that the equilibrium flow of the game with tolls produces a
flow that is a solution of the original miminization problem (2.3). In other words,
we want to see whether it is possible to achieve an optimum flow as an equilibrium
of a modified game.
We call τ = (τe)e∈E ∈ R
E a toll vector. Note that we allow both for positive
and negative tolls. We call cτe the cost of edge e under the toll τ , i.e., c
τ
e(xe) :=
ce(xe) + τe. Similarly c
τ
p(f ) :=
∑
e∈p c
τ
e (xe). Define Γ
τ := (G, I, cτ ). A toll vector
τ that for each demand vector µ ∈ RI+ enforces the corresponding system optimum
as the equilibrium in Γτ is called demand-independent optimal toll.
Definition 2.1 (Demand-independent optimal toll (DIOT)). Let Γ = (G, I, c). A
toll vector τ ∈ RE is called demand-independent optimal toll (DIOT) for Γ if for
every demand vector µ ∈ RI+ every corresponding equilibrium with tolls f
τ (µ) ∈
Eq(Γτ ) is optimal for Γ, i.e., L(fτ (µ)) =
∑
p∈p f
τ
p (µ)cp(f
τ (µ)) ≤ L(f(µ)) =∑
p∈P fpcp(f (µ)) for all f(µ) ∈ F(µ).
In § 1 we visited two games, the Pigou networks and Braess’ paradox, that admit
a DIOT. The aim of this paper is to characterize the networks Γ = (G, I, c) for
which DIOTs exist.
3. BPR-type cost functions
In this section, we give a complete characterization of the sets of cost functions
that admit a DIOT. On the positive side, we will show that any network with BPR-
type cost functions admits a DIOT, independently of the number of commodities
and the network topology. On the other hand, we show a strong lower bound
proving that for any non-BPR cost function there is a single-commodity game on
two parallel edges with costs functions c and c + t for some t ∈ R+ that does not
admit a DIOT. Formally, for β > 0, let
CBPR(β) = {c : R+ → R+ : c(x) = tc + acx
β for all x ≥ 0, a, t ∈ R+}
be the set of BPR-type cost functions with degree β.
The following theorem gives a sufficient condition for games with BPR-type cost
functions to admit a DIOT.
Theorem 3.1. Consider a game Γ = (G, I, c) such that there is β ∈ R+ with
ce ∈ CBPR(β) for all e ∈ E. Let τ be a toll vector such that∑
e∈p
(
τe +
β
β+1te
)
≤
∑
e∈p′
(
τe +
β
β+1 te
)
. (3.1)
for all i ∈ I and all p ∈ P˜ i and all p′ ∈ P i. Then, τ is a DIOT.
Proof. Fix a demand vector µ ∈ RI+ and a corresponding optimum flow f˜ (µ) in
Γ arbitrarily. We denote by x˜e =
∑
p∈P:e∈p f˜p(µ) the load imposed on edge e by
f˜(µ). The local optimality conditions of f˜ (µ) imply that for all i ∈ I and all
p, p′ ∈ P i with f˜p(µ) > 0 we have∑
e∈p
ce(x˜e) + c
′
e(x˜e)x˜e ≤
∑
e∈p′
ce(x˜e) + c
′
e(x˜e)x˜e.
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This implies that for all i ∈ I and all p, p′ ∈ P i with f˜p(µ) > 0, there exists a
non-negative constant λ(p, p′) ≥ 0 such that
λ(p, p′) +
∑
e∈p
(
(β + 1)aex˜
β
e + te
)
=
∑
e∈p′
(
(β + 1)aex˜
β
e + te
)
. (3.2)
We proceed to show that when the toll vector τ satisfies (3.1), then f˜ (µ) is a
Wardop equilibrium of Γτ . To this end, consider arbitrary p, p′ ∈ P i with f˜p(µ) > 0.
We have∑
e∈p
(
ce(x˜e) + τe
)
=
∑
e∈p
(
aex˜
β
e + te + τe
)
=
∑
e∈p
(
(β + 1)aex˜
β
e + te
)
−
∑
e∈p
(
βaex˜
β
e − τe
)
=
∑
e∈p′
(
(β + 1)aex˜
β
e + te
)
−
∑
e∈p
(
βaex˜
β
e − τe
)
− λ(p, p′),
=
∑
e∈p′
(
ce(x˜e) + τe
)
+
∑
e∈p′
(
βaex˜
β
e − τe
)
−
∑
e∈p
(
βaex˜
β
e − τe
)
− λ(p, p′),
where the third equality comes from (3.2). By assumption, the toll vector τ satisfies
equation (3.1) which implies
∑
e∈p τe −
∑
e∈p′ τe ≤ −
β
β+1
(∑
e∈p te −
∑
e∈p′ te
)
.
Therefore,∑
e∈p
(
ce(x˜e) + τe
)
≤
∑
e∈p′
(
ce(x˜e) + τe + βaex˜
β
e +
β
β+1 te
)
−
∑
e∈p
(
βaex˜
β
e +
β
β+1te
)
− λ(p, p′)
=
∑
e∈p′
(
ce(x˜e) + τe
)
+ β
β+1λ(p, p
′)− λ(p, p′)
=
∑
e∈p′
(
ce(x˜e) + τe
)
− 1
β+1λ(p, p
′),
where the first equality stems from (3.2). The statement of the theorem follows
from the fact that λ(p, p′) ≥ 0. 
As an immediate corollary of this theorem, we obtain the existence of DIOTs
in arbitrary multi-commodity networks with BPR-type cost functions as long as
negative tolls are allowed.
Corollary 3.2. Consider a game Γ = (G, I, c) with BPR-type cost functions. Then
there exists a DIOT for Γ.
Proof. Setting the toll vector τˆ = (τˆe)e∈E as
τˆe = −
β
β + 1
te, (3.3)
obviously satisfies (3.1), so that the claim follows from Theorem 3.1. 
In the following, we call τˆ the trivial DIOT. The necessary condition of The-
orem 3.1 implies in particular that
∑
e∈p τe +
β
β+1 te must be equal for all paths
p ∈ P˜ i and all pairs i ∈ I. We proceed to show that this is actually a necessary
condition for a DIOT.
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Theorem 3.3. Consider a game Γ = (G, I, c) with BPR-type cost functions. If τ
is a DIOT for Γ, then
∑
e∈p
(
τe +
β
β+1te
)
=
∑
e∈p′
(
τe +
β
β+1 te
)
.
for all i ∈ I and all p, p′ ∈ P˜ i.
Proof. Let p, p′ ∈ P˜ i be arbitrary. By definition of P˜ i there are demands vectors
µ,µ′ ∈ RI+ such that f˜p(µ) > 0 and f˜p′(µ
′) > 0. Hall (1978) showed that the
path flow functions of a Wardrop equilibrium are continuous functions in the travel
demand. For λ ∈ [0, 1], let µ(λ) = (1−λ)µ+λµ′ parametrize the travel demands on
the convex combination of µ and µ′. Then, by Hall’s result, there are continuous
path flow functions fp(µ(·)) : [0, 1] → R
E
+ for all p ∈ P such that f (µ(λ)) is a
Wardrop equilibrium for the travel demand vector µ(λ) for all λ ∈ [0, 1]. As the
system optimal flow f˜ is a Wardrop equilibrium with respect to the marginal cost
function (cf. Beckmann et al. (1956)), the same holds for the system optimum flow
vector f˜ , i.e., there are continuous path flow functions f˜p(µ(·)) : [0, 1]→ R
E
+ for all
p ∈ P such that f˜ (µ(λ)) is an optimal flow for the travel demand vector µ(λ) for
all λ ∈ [0, 1]. By the continuity of of the path flow functions, there are breakpoints
λ0, λ1, λ2, . . . , λt ∈ [0, 1] such that 0 = λ0 < λ1 < λ2 < · · · < λt = 1 and the
support S(f˜ (µ(λ)) = {p ∈ P : f˜p(µ(λ)) > 0} is constant on (λj , λj+1) for all
j ∈ {0, . . . , t− 1}. We claim that
∑
e∈p
(
τe +
β
β+1 te
)
=
∑
e∈p′
(
τe +
β
β+1te
)
for all p, p′ ∈
⋃
j∈{0,...,t−1}
S
(
f˜
(
µ
(λj+λj+1
2
)))
.
Since, by construction, p ∈ S
(
f˜
(
µ
(
λ0+λ1
2
)))
and p′ ∈ S
(
f˜
(
µ
(
λt−1+λt
2
)))
, the claim
implies the result.
We proceed to prove the claim by induction on the number of breakpoints.
First, let j ∈ {0, . . . , t − 1} be arbitrary and consider a travel demand µj,j+1 =
µ
(λj+λj+1
2
)
. We denote by x˜e(µj,j+1) =
∑
p∈P:e∈p f˜p(µj,j+1)) the load imposed by
the corresponding optimal flow.
Since τ is a DIOT for Γ, the optimal flow f˜(µj,j+1) is a Wardrop equilibrium
with respect to τ , i.e.,
∑
e∈p(ce(x˜e(µj,j+1)) + τe) =
∑
e∈p′(ce(x˜e(µj,j+1)) + τe) for
all p, p′ ∈ S(f˜ (µj,j+1)) which implies∑
e∈p
(
aex˜e(µj,j+1)
β + te + τe
)
=
∑
e∈p′
(
aex˜(µj,j+1)
β
e + te + τe
)
. (3.4)
for all p, p′ ∈ S(f˜ (µj,j+1)). By the local optimality conditions of f˜(µj,j+1)), we
further have∑
e∈p
ce(x˜e(µj,j+1))+c
′
e(x˜e(µj,j+1))x˜e(µj,j+1) =
∑
e∈p′
ce(x˜e(µj,j+1))+c
′
e(x˜e(µj,j+1))x˜e(µj,j+1),
which is equivalent to
∑
e∈p
(
(β + 1)aex˜e(µj,j+1)
β + te
)
=
∑
e∈p′
(
(β + 1)aex˜e(µj,j+1)
β + te
)
(3.5)
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for all p, p′ ∈ S(f˜ (µj,j+1)). Subtracting (3.5) from (β+1) times (3.4) and dividing
by β + 1 we obtain ∑
e∈p
(
β
β+1te + τe
)
=
∑
e∈p′
(
β
β+1 te + τe
)
(3.6)
for all j ∈ {0, . . . , t − 1} and all p, p′ ∈ S(f˜ (µj,j+1)). To finish the proof, note
that (3.4) and (3.5) imply that for all j ∈ {0, . . . , t − 1} there exist functions
f : [0, 1]→ R+ and g : [0, 1]→ R+ such that
fj,j+1(λ) =
∑
e∈p
aex˜e(µ(λ))
β + te + τe
gj,j+1(λ) =
∑
e∈p
(β + 1)aex˜e(µ(λ))
β + te
for all p ∈ S(f˜ (µj,j+1)) and all λ ∈ (λj , λj+1). By standard continuity arguments,
these equations hold also for all λ ∈ [λj , λj+1]. In particular, we obtain for µj =
µ(λj) the equations∑
e∈p
(
(β + 1)aex˜e(µj,j+1)
β + te
)
=
∑
e∈p′
(
(β + 1)aex˜e(µj,j+1)
β + te
)
∑
e∈p
(
β
β+1 te + τe
)
=
∑
e∈p′
(
β
β+1 te + τe
)
for all p, p′ ∈ S(f˜ (µj−1,j)) ∪ S(f˜ (µj,j+1)), and the claim follows from the same
arguments as before. 
We proceed to show that the set of BPR-type cost functions is the largest set of
cost functions that guarantee the existence of a DIOT, even for single-commodity
networks consisting of two parallel edges. The proof is deferred to the appendix.
Theorem 3.4. Let c be twice continuously differentiable, strictly semi-convex and
strictly increasing, but not of BPR-type. Then there is a congestion game Γ =
(G, I, c) with two parallel edges and cost functions c(x) and c(x)+t for some t ∈ R+
that does not have a DIOT.
A similar construction as in the proof of Theorem 3.4 shows also that a network
with two parallel edges with cost functions c1 ∈ CBPR(β1) and c2 ∈ CBPR(β2) does
not admit a DIOT if β1 6= β2.
4. Nonnegative tolls
The trivial DIOT toll τˆ is the trivial solution for both the sufficient condition
for a DIOT imposed by Theorem 3.1 and the necessary condistion for a DIOT
shown in Theorem 3.3. However, the trivial DIOT is always negative so that the
system designer needs to subsidize the traffic in order to enforce the optimum flow.
One may wonder whether the conditions imposed by Theorem 3.1 and Theorem 3.3
admit also a non-negative solution. Our next result shows that, for games played
on a directed acyclic multi-graph (DAMG), a non-negative DIOT can always be
found. The proof is deferred to the appendix.
Theorem 4.1. Consider a game Γ = (G, I, c) with BPR-type cost functions where
G is a DAMG. Then there exists a non-negative DIOT for Γ.
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v v
′
c1(x) = x
c2(x) = 1
c3(x) = x
c4(x) = 1
Figure 3. A cyclic network with positive tolls.
o
u
v
d
c1(x)=2
c4(x)=2
c6(x)=2c5(x)=4x
c2(x)=4x
c3(x)=1
(a) Cost functions.
o
u
v
d
c∗
1
(x)=2
c∗
4
(x)=2
c∗
6
(x)=2c∗
5
(x)=8x
c∗
2
(x)=8x
c∗
3
(x)=1
(b) Marginal cost functions.
Figure 4. Cost functions c and marginal cost functions c∗ for a
cyclic network.
The condition that the graph G is a DAMG is sufficient for the existence of a
non-negative DIOT. It is not necessary, as the following counterexample shows.
Example 4.1. Let Γ = (G, I, c) with I = {1, 2}, V = {v, v′}, o1 = d2 = v, o2 =
d1 = v
′, e1, e2 ∈ (o1 → d1), e3, e4 ∈ (o2 → d2), and the costs are as in Fig. 3 (a).
The graph G is not a DAMG, but the following non-negative toll is a DIOT:
τ1 =
1
2
τ2 = 0, τ3 =
1
2
, τ4 = 0.
We proceed to show that for graphs that contain a directed cycle, non-negative
DIOTs need not exist, even in networks with affine costs.
Proposition 4.2. There are networks with affine costs that do not admit a non-
negative DIOT.
Proof. Consider the game Γ = (G, I, c) with I = {1}, V = {o, u, v, d}, and e1 ∈
(o → u), e2 ∈ (u → d), e3 ∈ (v → u), e4 ∈ (u → v), e5 ∈ (o → v), and e6 ∈ (v, d)
shown in Fig. 4. For an edge ej we denote by cj the corresponding cost function.
In particular we assume
c1(x) = c4(x) = c6(x) = 2, c3(x) = 1, c2(x) = c5(x) = 4x.
We proceed to describe the pattern of the socially optimum flow f˜(µ) as a
function of the demand µ ≥ 0. To verify this, it may be helpful to consult the
marginal cost functions c∗(x) = (xc(x))′ shown in Fig. 4 (b) since the system
optimum flow f˜ (µ) is a Wardrop equilibrium for c∗
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For demands µ ≤ 1/8, only the path (eo,v, ev,u, eu,d) is used. When 1/8 <
µ < 1/4 the three paths (eo,v, ev,u, eu,d), (eo,u, eu,d), and (eo,v, ev,d) are used in the
system optimum. Finally for µ > 1/4 the paths (eo,u, eu,v, ev,d), (eo,u, ev,d), and
(eo,v, ev,d) are used in the system optimum. Note that all paths four paths from o
to d) are used in the system optimum for some demand so that P˜1 = P1.
Theorem 3.3 implies that for any DIOT τ we have
∑
e∈p te/2+τe =
∑
e∈p′ te/2+
τe for all all p, p
′ ∈ P˜ i. We derive the existence of a constant T ∈ R such that the
following equations hold:
T =
1
2
+ τ5 + τ3 + τ2, (4.1a)
T = 3 + τ1 + τ4 + τ6, (4.1b)
T = 1 + τ1 + τ2, (4.1c)
T = 1 + τ5 + τ6. (4.1d)
Subtracting both (4.1c) and (4.1d) from (4.1a) + (4.1a), we obtain 0 = 32 + τ3 + τ4
which implies that either τ3 or τ4 must be negative. 
5. Aggregatively non-negative Tolls
When nonnegative DIOTs do not exist, it is conceivable that a social planner
may sometime want to use negative tolls in order to achieve her goal. Nevertheless,
the planner may be subject to budget constraints and not be able to afford a toll
system that implies a global loss. Therefore it is interesting to study the existence
of conditions for a DIOT τ such that the following budget constraint is satisfied:∑
e∈E
τexe ≥ 0, for any feasible flow f . (5.1)
Intuitively, (5.1) requires that the social planner does not loose money for any
feasible flow. In this section, we show that when the origin-destination pairs (oi, di)
satisfy a order condition, then a DIOT satisfying the budget constraint exists.
Theorem 5.1. Consider a game Γ = (G, I, c) with BPR-type cost functions. If
there exists an order ≺ on V such that for all i ∈ I we have oi ≺ di, then there
exists a DIOT τ that satisfies (5.1).
We obtain the existence the budget feasible DIOTs for single commodity net-
works as a direct corollary of 5.1.
Corollary 5.2. Consider a game Γ = (G, I, c) with BPR-type cost and a single
O/D pair. Then, there exists a DIOT τ that satisfies (5.1).
Example 4.1 shows that the condition of Theorem 5.1 is only sufficient for the
existence of a DIOT that satisfies (5.1).
Acknowledgements.
Riccardo Colini-Baldeschi and Marco Scarsini are members of GNAMPA-INdAM.
Max Klimm gratefully acknowledges the support and hospitality of LUISS during
a visit in which this research was initiated.
References
Bai, L., Hearn, D. W., and Lawphongpanich, S. (2004). Decomposition techniques for the mini-
mum toll revenue problem. Networks, 44:142–150.
12
Bai, L., Hearn, D. W., and Lawphongpanich, S. (2010). A heuristic method for the minimum toll
booth problem. Journal of Global Optimization, 48:533–548.
Bai, L. and Rubin, P. A. (2009). Combinatorial Benders cuts for the minimum tollbooth problem.
Operations Research, 57:1510–1522.
Beckmann, M. J., McGuire, C., and Winsten, C. B. (1956). Studies in the Economics of Trans-
portation. Yale University Press, New Haven, CT.
Bergendorff, P., Hearn, D. W., and Ramana, M. V. (1997). Congestion toll pricing of traffic
networks. In Pardalos, P., Hearn, D., and Hager, W., editors, Network Optimization, volume
450 of Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems, pages 51–71. Springer,
Berlin, Heidelberg, Germany.
Bonifaci, V., Salek, M., and Schäfer, G. (2011). Efficiency of restricted tolls in non-atomic network
routing games. In Persiano, G., editor, Algorithmic game theory. SAGT 2011., volume
6982 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 302–313, Berlin, Heidelberg, Germany.
Springer.
Brown, P. N. and Marden, J. R. (2016). Avoiding perverse incentives in affine congestion games.
In Decision and Control (CDC 2016), Proceedings of the 55th IEEE Conference, pages
7010–7015.
Brown, P. N. and Marden, J. R. (2017). The robustness of marginal-cost taxes in affine congestion
games. IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control. To appear.
Caragiannis, I., Kaklamanis, C., and Kanellopoulos, P. (2006). Taxes for linear atomic congestion
games. In Azar, Y. and Erlebach, T., editors, Algorithms (ESA 2006), Proceedings of the
14th Annual European Symposium, pages 184–195. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg.
Christodoulou, G., Mehlhorn, K., and Pyrga, E. (2014). Improving the price of anarchy for selfish
routing via coordination mechanisms. Algorithmica, 69:619–640.
Cole, R., Dodis, Y., and Roughgarden, T. (2003). Pricing network edges for heterogeneous selfish
users. In Theory of Computing. STOC 2003, pages 521–530.
Cole, R., Dodis, Y., and Roughgarden, T. (2006). How much can taxes help selfish routing?
Journal of Computer and System Sciences, 72:444–467.
Dial, R. B. (1999). Minimal-revenue congestion pricing part i: A fast algorithm for the single-origin
case. Transportation Research, 33:189–202.
Dial, R. B. (2000). Minimal-revenue congestion pricing part ii: An efficient algorithm for the
general case. Transportation Research, 34:645–665.
Fleischer, L. (2005). Linear tolls suffice: new bounds and algorithms for tolls in single source
networks. Theoretical Computer Science, 348(2-3):217–225.
Fleischer, L., Jain, K., and Mahdian, M. (2004). Tolls for heterogeneous selfish users in multicom-
modity networks and generalized congestion games. In Foundations of Computer Science.
FOCS 2004, pages 277–285.
Fotakis, D. and Spirakis, P. G. (2008). Cost-balancing tolls for atomic network congestion games.
Internet Mathematics, 5(4):343–363 (2009).
Gomez-Ibanez, J. A. and Small, K. A. (1994). Road Pricing for Congestion Management: A
Survey of International Practice, volume 210. National Academy Press.
Hall, M. A. (1978). Properties of the equilibrium state in transportation networks. Transportation
Science, 12:208–216.
Han, D., Lo, H. K., Sun, J., and Yang, H. (2008). The toll effect on price of anarchy when costs
are nonlinear and asymmetric. European Journal of Operational Research, 186(1):300–316.
Harks, T., Kleinert, I., Klimm, M., and Möhring, R. H. (2015). Computing network tolls with
support constraints. Networks, 65:62–285.
Hearn, D. W. and Ramana, M. V. (1998). Solving congestion toll pricing models. In Marcotte, P.
and Nguyen, S., editors, Equilibrium and advanced transportation modeling, pages 109–124.
Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht, The Netherlands.
Hoefer, M., Olbrich, L., and Skopalik, A. (2008). Taxing subnetworks. In Papadimitriou, C. and
Zhang, S., editors, Internet and Network Economics. WINE 2008, volume 5385 of Lecture
Notes in Computer Science, pages 286–294, Berlin, Heidelberg, Germany. Springer.
13
Karakostas, G. and Kolliopoulos, S. G. (2005). The efficiency of optimal taxes. In Combinatorial
and algorithmic aspects of networking, volume 3405 of Lecture Notes in Comput. Sci., pages
3–12. Springer, Berlin.
Karakostas, G. and Kolliopoulos, S. G. (2006). Edge pricing of multicommodity networks for selfish
users with elastic demands. In Computing and combinatorics, volume 4112 of Lecture Notes
in Computer Science, pages 23–32. Springer, Berlin.
Knight, F. H. (1924). Some fallacies in the interpretation of social cost. Quarterly Journal of
Economics, 38:582–606.
Larsson, T. and Patriksson, M. (1999). Side constrained traffic equilibrium models—analysis,
computation and applications. Transportation Research Part B: Methodological, 33(4):233–
264.
Meir, R. and Parkes, D. (2016). When are marginal congestion tolls optimal? In The 9th
International Workshop on Agents in Traffic and Transportation (ATT@IJCAI16).
Pigou, A. C. (1920). The Economics of Welfare. Macmillan and Co., London, 1st edition.
Sandholm, W. H. (2002). Evolutionary implementation and congestion pricing. Review of Eco-
nomic Studies, 69(3):667–689.
Sandholm, W. H. (2007). Pigouvian pricing and stochastic evolutionary implementation. Journal
of Economic Theory, 132(1):367–382.
Singh, C. (2008). Marginal cost pricing for atomic network congestion games. Technical report,
Department of Electrical Communication Engineering, Indian Institute of Science.
Small, K. A. and Gómez-Ibáñez, J. A. (1997). Road pricing for congestion management: the
transition from theory to policy. Transport Economics, pages 373–403.
U.S. Bureau of Public Roads (1964). Traffic assignment manual. U.S. Department of Commerce,
Urban Planning Division.
Wardrop, J. G. (1952). Some theoretical aspects of road traffic research. In Proceedings of the
Institute of Civil Engineers, Part II, volume 1, pages 325–378.
Yang, H. and Huang, H.-J. (2004). The multi-class, multi-criteria traffic network equilibrium and
systems optimum problem. Transportation Research, 38:1–15.
14
Appendix A. Missing Proofs of Section 3
A.1. Proof of Theorem 3.4.
Proof. Let α ∈ R+ be arbitrary. All solutions of the differential equation
xf ′′(x)
f ′(x)
= α (A.1)
are of the form f(x) = ax
α+1
α+1 + b with a, b ∈ R. Since c is not of BPR-type, c does
not solve (A.1). In particular, there are y, z ∈ R+, with 0 < y < z such that
yc′′(y)
c′(y)
6=
zc′′(z)
c′(z)
. (A.2)
By continuity, we can choose y > 0 such that there is ε > 0 so that (A.2) hold for
all z ∈ (y, y + ε).
Consider the game Γ = (G, I, c) with V = {o, d} and e1, e2 ∈ (o → d) shown
in Fig. 5. The upper edge e1 has cost function c(x) while the lower edge has cost
function c(x) + t for some constant t ∈ R+ to be fixed later. Since the edges are
parallel, without loss of generality, we can consider toll vectors τ = (τ, 0), with
τ ≥ 0.
For small flow demands µ, both the system optimum and the equilibrium use the
upper edge only. The system optimum starts using the lower link for the unique µ0
satisfying
c(µ0) + µ0c
′(µ0) = c(0) + t.
To see that µ0 is unique, consider the marginal cost function c
∗ : R+ → [c(0),∞)
defined as c∗(x) = c(x) + xc′(x). As c is strictly semi-convex, xc(x) is convex
and, thus, c∗(x) = (xc(x))′ is strictly increasing. This implies that the inverse
function (x∗)−1 : [c(0),∞) → R+ is well-defined. We can then express µ0 as
µ0 = (c
∗)−1(c(0) + t) so that µ0 is unique.
For τ to be a DIOT it is necessary that also the equilibrium flow starts using
the lower edge at demand µ0, i.e., it is necessary that
c(µ0) + τ = c(0) + t.
As a consequence, for all demands µ ≥ µ0 both edges are used in equilibrium,
and the equilibrium flow (x1(µ), x2(µ)) is governed by the system of differential
equations
x′1(µ) =
1
c′(x1(µ))
1
c′(x1(µ))
+ 1
c′(x2(µ))
x′2(µ) =
1
c′(x2(µ))
1
c′(x1(µ))
+ 1
c′(x2(µ))
with the initial values x1(µ0) = µ0 and x2(µ0) = 0, see Harks et al. (2015) for a
reference. Similarly, since the system optimum is at equilibrium with respect to the
o d
c1(x) = c(x)
c2(x) = c(x) + t
Figure 5. Network consisting of two parallel edges.
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marginal costs c∗, its flow (x˜1(µ), x˜2(µ)) is governed by the system of differential
equations
x˜′1(µ) =
1
2c′(x˜1(µ))+x˜1c′′(x˜1(µ))
1
2c′(x˜1(µ))+x˜1(µ)c′′(x˜1(µ))
+ 12c′(x˜2)+x˜2(µ)c′′(x˜2(µ))
x˜′2(µ) =
1
2c′(x˜2(µ))+x˜2(µ)c′′(x˜2(µ))
1
2c′(x˜1(µ))+x˜1c′′(x˜1(µ))
+ 12c′(x˜2(µ))+x˜2c′′(x˜2(µ))
with the initial values x˜1(µ0) = µ0 and x˜2(µ0) = 0. For τ to be a DIOT it is
necessary to have that x2(µ0) = x˜2(µ0) for all µ ≥ µ0.
We claim that we can choose t > 0 such that no DIOT exists. For a contradiction,
let us assume that for all t > 0 we have x2(µ) = x˜2(µ) for all µ ≥ µ0. This implies
in particular that x′2(µ0) = x˜
′
2(µ0) for all µ ≥ µ0. Since we assumed x˜1(µ) = x1(µ)
and x˜2(µ) = x2(µ) for all µ ≥ µ0, this implies
1
c′(x2(µ))
1
c′(x1(µ))
+ 1
c′(x2(µ))
=
1
2c′(x2(µ))+x2(µ)c′′(x2(µ))
1
2c′(x1(µ))+x1(µ)c′′(x1(µ))
+ 12c′(x2(µ))+x2(µ)c′′(x2(µ)))
for all µ ≥ µ0.
This is equivalent to
1
c′(x2(µ))
c′(x1(µ))
+ 1
=
1
2c′(x2(µ))+x2(µ)c′′(x2(µ))
2c′(x1(µ))+x1(µ)c′′(x1(µ))
+ 1
for all µ ≥ µ0
implying
c′(x2(µ))
c′(x1(µ))
=
2c′(x2(µ)) + x2(µ)c
′′(x2(µ))
2c′(x1(µ)) + x1(µ)c′′(x1(µ))
for all µ ≥ µ0.
We obtain
x1(µ)c
′′(x1(µ))
c′(x1(µ))
=
x2(µ)c
′′(x2(µ))
c′(x2(µ))
for all µ ≥ µ0. (A.3)
Since c is strictly increasing, both x1(µ) and x2(µ) tend to infinity as µ goes to
infinity. Since, in addition, x2(µ0) = 0 and x2(µ) is continuous, there is µ
∗ so
that x2(µ
∗) = y. Such µ∗t = µ
∗, in fact, exists for all t > 0. We claim that
limt→0 x1(µ
∗
t ) = y. To see this, note that we have c
∗(x1(µ
∗
t )) = c
∗(x2(µ
∗
t )) since we
assumed that the equilibrium flow x is optimal. This implies
c(x1(µ
∗
t )) + x1(µ
∗
t )c
′(x1(µ
∗
t )) = c(x2(µ
∗
t )) + t+ x2(µ
∗
t )c
′(x2(µ
∗
t ))
= c(y) + t+ yc′(y),
so that x1(µ
∗
t ) = (c
∗)−1(c∗(y)+ t). As c∗ is strictly increasing, (c∗)−1 is continuous
implying limt→0 x1(µ
∗
t ) = y. From there, we derive that for t sufficiently small we
have x1(µ
∗
t ) ∈ (y, y+ ε). We constructed a contradiction between (A.2) and (A.3),
which finishes the proof. 
A.2. Proof of Theorem 4.1.
Proof. Given a DAMG there exists a topological sort, namely a linear ordering
≺ of its vertices such that, if v ≺ v′, then there is no path from v′ to v in the
DAMG. Notice that, in general the topological sort of a DAMG is not unique. Let
|V| = n and call v≺ = (v(1), . . . , v(n)) the vector of ordered vertices. For each edge
e ∈ (v(i) → v(j)), define
δe := j − i. (A.4)
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Let τˆ be the trivial DIOT of the game Γ and let
ξ := min
e∈E
τˆe
δe
and χ := ξ−, (A.5)
where ξ− = max{−ξ, 0} is the negative part of ξ. Define now
τe = τˆe + δeχ. (A.6)
We first prove that the toll vector τ is non-negative. Notice that χ, defined as in
(A.5) is non-negative and χ = 0 only if τˆe ≥ 0 for all e ∈ E . Assume that there
exists a τˆe < 0 and let e
∗ ∈ argmine∈E τˆe/δe. Then
τe∗ = τˆe∗ + δe∗χ = τˆe∗ − δe∗
ˆτe∗
δe∗
= 0.
In general, whenever τe < 0, we have
τe = τˆe + δeχ = τˆe − δe
ˆτe∗
δe∗
≥ τˆe − δe
τˆe
δe
= 0.
Now we prove that the toll vector τ is a DIOT. By Theorem 3.1, this means
that it satisfies equation (3.1). First, notice that, by construction of the δe, for any
i ∈ I, we have ∑
e∈p
δe =
∑
e∈p′
δe for all p, p
′ ∈ P i. (A.7)
By (3.1) we have
∑
e∈p
(
(β + 1)τˆe + βte
)
=
∑
e∈p′
(
(β + 1)τˆe + βte
)
,
hence, by (A.7),
∑
e∈p
(
(β + 1)(τˆe + δeχ) + βte
)
=
∑
e∈p′
(
(β + 1)(τˆe + δeχ) + βte
)
,
that is ∑
e∈p
((β + 1)τe + βte) =
∑
e∈p′
((β + 1)τe + βte) ,
which finishes the proof. 
Appendix B. Missing Proofs of Section 5
B.1. Proof of Theorem 5.1.
Proof. Consider the trivial DIOT τˆ . Define now
τe(γ) = τˆe + δeγ, (B.1)
where δ is defined as in (A.4). Notice that δe can be negative, but, for each path
p ∈ P i we have ∑
e∈p
δe = d
i − oi =: ∆i.
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Hence ∑
e∈E
τe(γ)xe =
∑
e∈E
τˆexe + γ
∑
e∈E
δexe
=
∑
e∈E
τˆexe + γ
∑
e∈E
δe
∑
p∋e
fp
=
∑
e∈E
τˆexe + γ
∑
i∈I
∑
p∈Pi
fp
∑
e∈p
δe
=
∑
e∈E
τˆexe + γ
∑
i∈I
∑
p∈Pi
fp∆
i
=
∑
e∈E
τˆexe + γ
∑
i∈I
µi∆i.
Since µi and ∆i are positive for all i ∈ I, by choosing γ big enough, the quantity∑
e∈E τe(γ)xe can be made positive. 
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